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Property relationships and the mode of production in the South 
African Republic present a number of interesting historical and 
conceptual problems. A market in land existed from the beginning of 
White Afrikaner occcpation of the territory north of the Vaal river, 
which led to rapid accumulation among Afrikaner notables and landlessness 
among their clients. The major source of profit from agriculture (and 
the source of support for both notables and clients) lay in the various 
forms of rent paid by African producers who had often been the 
cultivators of the land prior tc its seizure by Afrikaner settlers. The 
state which emerged from these property relations was created by the 
dominant, quasi-feudal notables who, with their functionaries, used 
their dominant position to acquire more land. In addition to the 
accumulation of land by Afrikaner notables, speculative land companies 
owned by South African-based entrepreneurs with European financial 
connections contributed to the proletarianization of sections of the 
Afrikaner population. Partly in an attempt to alleviate intra-Afrikaner 
conflict, Afrikaner notables who controlled the state used their position 
to make irregular exactions upon the internationally financed deep level 
gold mining industry which was established in the last decade of the 19th 
century. Because profits from gold mining investments were delayed, 
these exactions caused intense anxiety about costs. In addition, the 
sys tem of land holding (determined by custom or speculative ownership) 
led to under-utilization and made it impossible to meet the gold mines' 
need for cheap food. The systems of agricultural production and gold 
mining production were incompatible, and after the South African War of 
1899-1902 property relationships in agriculture swiftly changed. But, 
while the notables were transformed into capitalist farmers, the 
proletarianization of their former clients continued to its ultimate 
conclusion. 
In 1850, ten years before the final unification of the four 
major Voortrekker communities north of the Vaal, the White settlers were 
a relativelg homogeneous population, committed to providing large tracts 
of land for members of their maatschapii. The leaders of the several 
parties of pastoralists were comparatively wealthy and, as a result, 
they and their kind were in an advantaged position when the original 
distribution of land took place. Nevertheless, the rela.tionship of a 
leader to his followers was such that his power m d  prestige depended 
upon their support, and, although inequalities were present, if gross 
advantage had been taken of these, links - tenuous as they were - would 
have dissolved. The major factor reinforcing what was in effect a 
client-patron relationship was the creation of a number of forced 
labour and tributary relationships between Afrikaner groups and Africa 
peoples. These relationships were the result of partial military 
conquest and were only uneasily maintained and expanded by force. The 
maintenance of the burgher militia - commandos - was both very expensive 
and made necessary the use of foreign currency. Commandos had not only 
to be fed while they were in the field but their imported arms and 
itwnuni-tion had to be paid for in negotiable foreign currency. It is 
probable that an important source of power for the notables was their 
ability to provide foreign currency. (1) The administrative machinery 
of the embryonic state was incapable of collecting sufficient revenue to 
finance both military expenditure and the barest essentials of civil 
administration, including the collecting of taxes. Between 1850 and 1876 
the cost of acquiring and defending land was far more than the 
republican exchequer could pay, and payment was therefore made by 
securing land against debts. This, in its tuun, iiivolved the state 
inevitably in the search for new land with further expenditure which was 
again secured by the provision of land against Republican currency. 
Land used to secure debts was no longer available for burgher occupation 
and provided a further reason for the conquest of more land. 
In an attempt to solve the financial problems caused by 
militaqr expenditure and the initial inability to raise revenue, two 
related sets of financial manipulations were attempted. Within the 
first set of proposals the simplest aspects involved providing land in 
lieu of salaries for administrators and directing creditors to taxpayers 
who were in arrears. More complex was the issuing of exchequer bills or 
Masldaaten for services rendered to the state. Mandaaten were not legal 
tender but were secured by government farms. ( 2 m n e x t  measure, 
taken in 1865, five years after all the Transvaal burgher communities 
had combined to form the South African Republic, was the issuing of 
paper currency. The notes also were secured by government farms and 
were intended to recall the Mandaaten. The number of Mandaaten issued 
exceeded the notes issued by the Republic, and a further issue, again 
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secured against government farms - 300 on this occasion - was made in 
1867. These notes were insufficient to meet new government expenditure 
and in 1868 a finance commission was established which proposed, among 
other things, the issue of more notes against no less than 1000 farms 
or 3,000,000 morgen. It is extremely difficult to summarize the 
variations of these schemss which were introduced not only by the 
Volksraad but by Landdrosts, who issued an unrecorded number of MaYldaaten 
and failed to recall either their own or the state" issue when required 
to do so. Iy? addition, clergymen, traders, and private individuals 
issued pod-fors because of the monetary chaos. It is hardly surprising 
that the Republic's currency was unacceptable in most commercial 
transactions and there were occasions when even government departments 
refused to accept currency which was supposedly legal tender. (3) 
The second set of financial proposals concerned attempts to 
establish a bank among the burgher communities and had less impact than 
the monetary programne, but they help to illustrate the use to which 
land was put. The earliest proposal was made by a Hollander, Jacobus 
Stuart, who had very close connections with Amsterdam merchants 
involved in the South African trade. (4.) Stuart's proposals, accepted 
by the Potchefstroom Volksraad in 1853, involved his being given the 
right to sell a hundred 3,000 morgen farms in Holland for £450 each. 
The capital raised by the sale of these farms was to be invested in the 
Landsbank and the Dutch settlers Stuart hoped to attract were to be 
invited to subscribe additional share capital to the bank. Stuart had 
no success in Holland. Whatever chances of success he may have had were 
in any case reduced by the scepticism of rival Dutch merchants. (5) 
Similar proposals were made a decade later in 1865 by a 
Scottish adventurer, Alexander McCorkindale, who advocated the 
establishment of a Bank der Z .A. Republiek . - McCorkindale had previously 
undertaken to establish the London and South African Commercial, 
Agricultural and Mining Company which was to purchase two hundred farms 
from the government at £40 each and settle these with European 
immigrants. Eventually eighty farms were purchased - in all, about 
110,000 norgen - in an area of the eastern Transvaal named New Scotland. 
McCorkindale made a variety of industrial and commercial proposals to 
Pretorius and the Vol.ksraad. He proposed building a harbour on Delagoa 
Bay and making the Maputa and Pongola rivers navigable. In addition, 
he proposed constmrcting roads, improving the postal service, and 
attracting engineers, mechanics, doctors and teachers from Europe ta the 
Republic. To undertake these schemes he required that the government 
provide him with a hundred farms as security for the raising of a loan 
of S250,000 and for his services he proposed that the government give 
him two hundred farms. Nothing came of these later proposals but they 
indicate the profligate way in which commercial adventurers were ready 
to dispose of land. (6) 
The Republic failed to establish a bank of its own, but its 
new President, Francois Ekngers, was able to negotiate a favourable loan 
with the Cape Commercial Bank and the state was therefore able to redeem 
its outstanding debts. The bank was heavily involved in supporting the 
Burgers' regime for what de Kiewiet describes as "political and not 
financialt' reasons. (7) Burgers' attempt to raise a further European 
loan was apparently intended to free himself from the Cape Bank's 
tutelage. It was also intended that capital be raised for building a 
railway from Delagoa Bay to the Republic, which would have freed the 
Republic from dependence on the ports of British colonies; but no 
sooner had Burgers made these attempts than the Republic was involved in 
another and very costly war against the Pedi. The Commercial Bank 
despaired of recovering its loans and the Republic's creditors played 
an important part in persuading the British Government to annex the 
territory, which was, of course, part of its wider political programme. 
Annexation did not save the Cape Commercial Bank, which went into 
liquidation in 1881, claiming land worth S400,000 which it had been 
given as security for its loans. (8) 
The administration of the Transvaal (as the annexed Republic 
was called) was placed under Theophilus Shepstone, the Natal 
administrator. Shepstone made J. C. A. Henderson his honorary 
financial Commissioner, which promised little for a change in the 
Transvaalts property relations. The latter had been a banker, was one 
of the prime movers in attempting to raise capital for a railway from 
Durban to the Transvaal, which left him hostile toward Burger's Delagoa 
Bay proposals, and while in Shepstone's service established what de 
Kiewiet has called "one of those land-jobbing ~ornpanies~~. Hendersonls 
Transvaal Board of Executors and Trust Company included the Government 
secretary, two managing officials of the Cape Commercial Bank, and 
George Moodie, "the entirely dishonest promoter of the Lebombo Railway 
Companyf1. (9) Before the Cape Commercial Bank went into liquidation, 
Henderson had appropriated British funds to give its claims preferential 
treatment. His activities undermined British policy and went a long way 
toward creating the conditions which rallied republicans to overthrow 
the regime, but, his association with the Transvaal was not to end there. 
In 1900 Henderson's Consolidated Corpors,tion Limited owned 80 farms in 
the Transvaal, and it is very probable that he vrae himself a director 
of other land companies. (10) In 1900, when the Lands Settlement 
Commission took evidence, it was told that 1400 farms were cmed by 
land companies. Intelligence reports, however, indicate that at least 
another 700 farms were owned by companies. J. S. Marais reports that 
in 1899 the Colonial Office receive& a letter from a committee 
claiming to represent companies who owned over eight million acres in 
the Republic. The view that these land companies were merely ancillary 
to mining activities is not well founded. The prospectus of the Oceana 
Land Company, published in London in 1891, offergd 105 farms suitable 
for agricultural purposes, and by 1900 the Cornpan;- owned 224 farms. (12) 
Many of the Transvaal Consolidated Land Exploration Companps 656 fams 
were acquired before 1883, and it offered for sale in 1594 a large 
nmber of fams suitable for agricultural purposes. For its part, the 
Republic continued to use land to secure its debts; Paul Kruger was 
reported to have given lla large amount of land" to, among others, the 
Netherlands Railway Company. (13) 
It should be apparent that the usual explana.tion for 
lllandlessnessll in the T~ansvaal is unsatisfactory. It is not enough 
to posit a group of mprogressive farmers lacking initiative, but set 
c,n providing a landed inheritance by subdividing land rintil it was n.o 
longer economically viable. Rural impoverishment should be set ag~inst 
land acc-uulation and the relationship between the two should be 
noied. (24) The process by which land becairLe the i3epublic's major 
resource in its dealings with outsiders was initiated in its dsalings 
with its own officials. Land accumulation be&- among officials who 
were given land in lieu of salaries and thereby gradual.1~ encouraged 
t o  perceive land as a marketable asset. To begin with, this may have 
created hardship. (15) But it was ultimately perceived as gain when 
land values increased. When we ask what; kind of people within the 
various cornunities became officials, we see that the situation was 
one which provided opportunities for certain members of the community 
to consolidate already existing advantages. Nost officials were 
elected and the landdrost - the only appointed official - was 
dependent upon local approval for the confirmation and retention of 
this appointment. (16) The field comet who had most local authority 
was ~lrnost invariably elected from a family of local notables. Status 
was acquired from wealth in cattle,and wealth in cattle made men 
sedentary. With large herds, activities were centralized, and kin and 
others were employed to take cattle to widely dispersed pastures. In a 
community where there was constant movement among burgher farmers, some 
of them abandoning old and seeking new pastures, few people were settled 
long enough to acquire local status. 
The field cornet - the most pivotal official of the burgher 
state - played interchangeable military and civil roles. He was 
responsible to the Krijgsraad (~ilitary council) and to the 
administrative and judicial authority of the landdrost. In his military 
role he was entrusted with maintaining a list of combatants in his ward 
and for summoning these for military service. But, above all, the field 
comet was responsible for inspecting claims to farms to enable them to 
be transferred from the state to citizens of the republic, and for 
"placingf1 in service " every "coloured person" not "subordinate to any 
of the native captains". (17) It is apparent, therefore, that despite 
the rules of the constitution (and the fact that he was usually a benign 
paternal figure) (18), the field comet, having so nuch within his power 
the apportionment of land and African labour in a c:ommunity of constant 
flux, was well placed for accumulating landed property. The landdrost, 
who 1~78s res=onsible for putting up for sale land for which taxes had not 
been paid, had access to valuable information about land on the market. 
His responsibility for the issuing of licences to "shopkeepers, itinerant 
foreign traders, auctioneers" and his role as chief judicial officer 
enhanced his authority. It is probably fair to say that officials formed 
a class,since about half of those who had been field cornets between 1839 
and 1870 became members of the Volksraad between 1845 and 1880. (19) 
In the two decades between 1850 and 1870 the burghers of the 
Transvaal were relatively prosperous and one should not equate the 
condition of the state's finances with that of its citizens. Ostrich 
feathers, ivory, cattle, hides and wool provided substantial exports, 
particularly from the Potchefstroom district. (20) The traders who came 
originally as smouses to nagmaal remained to establish permanent stores. 
They exchanged their goods for agricultural products or products of the 
hunt, which they sold or passed on to their principals in the coastal 
ports. Despite their hinterland Transvaal dorps had a solid core of 
English businessmen, who were joined or replaced at the end of the 19th 
century by Jews of East &ropean descent. (21) 
The combination of President Burghersfsloan, the discovery of 
gold in the Qdenburg district, m d  the experience of administration 
made for greater efficiency, and by 1870, for example, officials were 
receiving their money salaries. In the main, however, an improvement 
in administration meant primarily an improvement in tax collecting. It 
coincided with a general decline in prosperity among the republic's 
citizens which was intensified by relatively efficient tax collection. 
Game was now a wasting asset, m d  those who had primarily been hunters 
abandoned or sold farms and followed the diminishing elephant herds. 
Between 1850 m d  1868 various Volksraads attempted to raise taxes by 
exhortation, fines, proclamations and hectoring instructions to 
landdrosts,with little or no effect. (22) By 1873 the situation had 
changed dramatically. It is significant that the Volksraad found it 
necessary to pass a resolution instructing landdrosts not to sell 
freehold fams of debtors for less than the owners owed the state. (23) 
For those who owed the state money and were faced with having to leave 
their farms, to sell was more to their advantage than merely to abandon, 
and who was better placed to know that an owner wished to sell (or 
barter) his farm than local officials involved in tax assessment and 
collection? Although the imminent auction of abandoned farms had to be 
advertised in the Staats Courant, and later also in the local papers, 
local officials were in the best position to know whether land was 
coming onto the market. (24) As a young field comiet, Paulus Kruger 
is said to have acquired several farms Ifby barterv before 1846, and 
before he became president he acquired much land at a time when it 
"went beggingn. The future Commandant-General of the Republic, Piet 
Joubert, as a field cornet had acquired over a dozen farms by 1871. A 
field comet and native commissioner in Vrjlleid, Louis Botha, acquired 
or purchased six farms, in all 16,000 acres, before he was elected to 
the Second Volksraad in 1895 to begin a political career-which culminated 
in his being the first Prime lvrinister of the Union of South Africa. (25) 
In the last two decades of the centmy the dominant group of 
Afrikmer landowners had established an informal network which provided 
them with information which enabled them to accumulate profitable 
landholdings. Piet Joubert was in a fortunate position since "persone 
wat hulle vaste einedom wou verkoop het horn dikwels, en selde te vergeefs 
omcn aanbod genaderfl. (26) The Republicls last Registrar of Deeds said 
of one of huger's close associates, Alois Hugo Nellmapius, who bought 
a large number of farms at public auctions after 1883, that he "knew the 
country well himself and obtained good informationrr. (27) But who 
could have had better information than the very same Registrar of Deeds, 
Christoffel Minnaar,who was a director of the Transvaal Land Exploration 
Compaay, or the Surveyor General of the republic, Johaanes Rissik, who 
was the Compaayf S Chairman? (28) Likewise, Louis Botha "had his 
connections everywhererr. He not only mmaged a "land syndicatefr with his 
patron, the first Volksraad member for Vryheid, Lucas Meyer, but his 
syndicate, we are baldly told, "yielded its thousand pounds from time to 
timef1. Immediately after the South African War he was able to profit 
from selling land and "indulging his speculative bentfr. (29) 
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Because the rich are always with us, so are the poor. The 
device to which the republic's governments always resorted in an attempt 
to cope with poverty was expansion into African areas, whether within or 
beyond the state's customary boundaries. This was never more than a 
palliative measure, and ultimately made the situation worse. If land 
acquired from Africans provided a tolerable surplus from agriculture or 
mining, then it was almost certain to fall into the hands of rich 
burghers or land companies. If new land did not attract the attention 
of notables or speculators, then the poor who were settled on it - Irde 
arme kl.as waar uit onze bevolking grootlyks bestaatfr (30) - were 
unlikely to succeed in getting the necessary attention of the central 
government. New settlements at the very least need administration to 
establish access to water and to secure the issuing of Land titles. 
Yet it is evident from the experience of the burghers granted land in 
the territory known to them as the 'rMapochs grondenrv that, without the 
abili.ty to influence the President, his executive or the Volksraad, 
minimum administration was not forthcoming. The Mapoch settlers, 
although they owned little property, were not without political 
energies and it was the unresponsiveness of the administration which 
wore them down. (31) Their attempts to acquire title deeds were 
frustrated for more than twenty years, and they were finally granted 
only after the fall of the republic and the establishment of Crown 
Colony rule. It took the central administration of the republic ten 
years to make provision for the issuing of lloccupation-farml' title 
deeds. This was partly the result of the Executive Councilfs failure 
to inform the Volksraad of the need to provide for this modified form 
of tenure. Between 1883 and 1889 the settlers constantly petitioned 
the Volksraad to look into their affairs. Finally, in 1895, they were 
asked to provide transfer fees which were beyond their means. These 
were quickly waived but the Volksraad resolution doing so was not 
published for another eighteen months. In the meantime, the settlers 
were asked to pay survey costs, stamp duties, and for title deeds. 
There were other examples of government inertia and inefficiency which 
had a debilitating effect on the settlers. Regulations were required 
for the distribution of water in order to stop disputes which began 
immediately after the first settlers took possession. The Executive 
instructed local officials to settle all disputes out of court, but 
when this was found to be impossible the local field comet and the 
landdrost of Middleburg proposed draft regulations to the Volksraad at 
regular intervals between 1884 and 1889 - the year in which these were 
finally adopted. Even then, the regulations were printed but never 
distributed. It is inconceivable that burghers with large landed and 
other interests would have been neglected in the way in which the 
Mapoch settlers were. (32) 
Although the subdivision of land and the diminution of gane 
may have left many to eke out a precarious livelihood, it is probable 
that m a n y  burghers never owned land at any time. Not all of these can 
be described as llindigentll. (33) Many who arrived after the initial 
land grants had been made became tenant or squatter fa.rmers on the land 
of large owners. The form of tenure by which these tenants held land 
varied considerably, though it was always informa1,and although all 
tenant-squatters are now categorized as llbywoners" it is probable that 
a number of relationships are subsumed under this heading. It may well 
be that the usual description of bywoner is derived from observations 
made during the crucial period of change when land was being transformed 
from non-capitalist to capitalist production. Grosskcpfreported that 
"several of the old Transvaalers objected to the word llbywonerll. "We 
used to say", he was told, "that we obtained 'vergunning' [concession] 
on the farm." (34) Mayly who were to become known as bywoners came from 
the Orange Free State and from the Cape in the last quarter of the 19th 
century and were men with movable property. They provided the landowner 
with a share of their crops and added to his status; the landlord was 
able to call upon his bywoners for commando service and they provided 
his family with affinal society. The bywoner's status declined and his 
tenure became more precarious, not because there was a shortage of land 
but because land became commercially viable. The bywoner,who previously 
had added to the landlordts status,in a changed situation became an 
incumbrance. The South African War provided the opportunity for many 
landlords to refuse to resume patronage for those bywoners who had left 
the land to serve with Boer commandos. (35) 
By the last decade 01' the 19th century, when capital 
intensive gold mining was well under way, the dominant class had 
maintained non-capitalist property relationships for a quarter of a 
century. The gold mining industry at T3a.rbert0n~an.d then on the 
Witwatersrand, created new entrepreneurial opportunities for this class. 
In order to raise revenue for the state after independence was regained 
in 1881, Paul Krugerls concessions policy was brought into being, the 
intention of which was to encourage those with capital and technical 
and maaagerial skill to come to the republic by grating them monopolies 
to produce industrial goods. It was a revival of McCorkindalefs 
proposals. Xrmger initially envisaged that the concessions would 
provide the state with substantial revenue, create a market for local 
raw materials, and allow the concessionaire to make a handsome profit 
from his monopoly position. In practice, the policy did not have this 
effect. From the very beginning concessions were granted to those who 
were close to the President' S coterie (the so-called Irthi.rd ~olksraad~') 
or were members of it, to members of the Executive Council or the 
Volksraad (both to those who supported the policy and to those who were 
its bitterest critics), and to hi@ officials of the government. Without 
the requisite skills, most concessionaires treated their concessions as 
one more resource with which to speculate. And speculation brought them 
into conflict with mining capital. 
Speculation, by its very nature, was unproductive and 
depended altimately for its own existence on a subordinate productive 
relationship. The speculator, who was usually a large landowner, could 
hope for little from his traditional landed clients, whose productive 
capacity was limited. In any event, their major function as clients was 
to serve in commandos, acquiring booty or labour from African peoples. 
Moreover, as the land market improved, client-patron relationships were 
undermined. Within the agrarian economy the major productive groups 
were African cultivators who either worked their own lands and paid 
tribute or farmed rented land, or worked - largely under duress - as 
labourers where mite farmers were engaged in productive activities. 
This resulted in Africans - who came to the gold fields from outside 
the Republic - having to run a gauntlet of field cornets set on 
acquiring labourers for themselves and their fellow burghers. Those 
who controlled the state in the South African Republic came into 
conflict with mining interests at every point in their economic 
activi.ties, The concessions policy (particularly the dynamite 
concession) added significantly to the cost of gold mining and delayed 
their becoming profitable. A struggle for power between the governing 
class and mining capitalists became inevitable, but this is not to 
argue that the form which it took was inevitable. The weakening of the 
client-patron relationships and the growing but regionally uneven rural 
impoverishment might have led to an intra-Afrikaner class conflict. 
Afrikaners had taken to arms against Afrikaners before, and they were 
to do so again. The Lichtenburg commando, which took to the field 
during the 1914 rebellion, was made up of impoverished cultivators, 
while the Afrikaners of the eastern Transvaal who rallied to Botha's 
call were from a prosperous region which was benefiting from their 
Parliamentary leader's agrarian policy. Intra-Afrikaner class conflict 
was delayed by the mining capitalists who were new men of economic and 
political power. They were unversed in the pragmatic politics of older 
capitalist classes, and the extent to which power was concentrated in 
their hands had given them the belief that they could do anything. The 
result was the Jameson Raid which, when combined with later agitations, 
helped to create a climate which prepared both sides for war, and for a 
time reduced intra-Afrikaner tensions. 
The results of the South African War were, as we know, many 
and far reaching. One of its most important consequences was the 
hastening of the change of property relationships in agriculture and a 
rapid increase in food production. (36) Milnerl S land policy (devised, 
without success, to create a class of English commercial farmers) 
provided the opportunity for large Afrikaner land and cattle holders to 
acquire liquid capital, and this, together with the benefits which the 
sane group derived from compensation granted for loss of property, made 
commercial agriculture viable. Because it was only those with large 
landed interests who were able to take advantage of Milnerls schemes, 
intra-Afrikaner tensions were soon revived. This conflict is usually 
depicted as having arisen from differing stands taken by Afrikaners 
during the war, as being the perpetuation of conflict between hensoppers 
and national scouts, on the one hand, and bittereinders,on the other, and 
Botha's policy of reconciliation is accordingly depicted in purely party 
political and nationalist terms. But how many scouts and hensoppers 
were there that it required Botha to frame his policy around them? That 
Afrikaner society was riven with conflict is apparent. Whether these 
conflicts were solely the result of positions adopted during the war is, 
however open to question, and it would appear that a more satisfactory 
structural explanation is available. 
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